


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Knowing Peace When You See It: Setting Standards for Peacebuilding Success

CHARLES T. CALL

What constitutes a successful peacebuilding outcome? This paper identifies four common standards for peacebuilding success and explores them conceptually and operationally. War recurrence, the most salient marker of peacebuilding failure, is a necessary but insufficient indicator. Yet other standards are also problematic. This paper argues for a standard that includes (a) the recurrence of large-scale organised violence, plus (b) political and institutional elements that minimally indicate a state capacity for resolving social conflicts peaceably. Even as better cross-national indicators of institutionalising peace are needed, national and international decisionmakers should interpret any such standards with caution and in ways that are highly context-specific in developing policies.

Scholars and international policymakers have long sought to find ways to end armed conflicts. Recently, however, they have devoted new attention to going beyond a simple cease-fire to consolidating self-sustaining peace. Several countries embody the challenge of moving beyond apparent success in ending war to confused and disputed success in achieving peace.

Consider the experiences of Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, and East Timor in the 1990s. In each case analysts considered these countries success stories: wars had concluded; elected governments had taken office; the international press had moved on. Yet in each case, the sustainability of peace was soon questionable. In Liberia, Haiti, and East Timor, serious political violence returned to threaten or topple the very elected regimes that signified earlier success. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the presence of international troops seemed indispensable to prevent renewed warfare. Were these cases of successful peacebuilding? Were they complete failures? How do we know?

At the root of these difficult judgements are divergent standards of success. War recurrence – the outbreak of full armed hostilities with widespread loss of human life – is a clear sign of failure. The failure of the 1991 Bicesse accord in Angola and of the 1993 Arusha peace accords in Rwanda are clear examples of failed peace, where the subsequent violence exceeded the pre-accord levels of war dead.¹

However, short of war recurrence, the standards of success remain murky. Do the levels of post-war political violence experienced by Nicaragua and Cambodia in the early 1990s, or by East Timor and Haiti in 2006, constitute failed peacebuilding? Should failure be declared when a civilian government elected amid international acclaim turns towards one-party authoritarianism (consider Haiti's earlier Preval

and Aristide governments, Rwanda's Kagame administration, Liberia's Taylor government, and perhaps Joseph Kabila's administration)? Does the persistent inability of the state to provide basic services, as in present-day Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, constitute failed peace consolidation? And where does economic recovery fit in? Are low levels of growth, high levels of unemployment, or inconformity with IFI policy guidelines themselves indicators of failed peace consolidation, or are they explanatory variables that may help account for the return of violence?

This article examines four common approaches to about evaluating peacebuilding outcomes. The term 'peacebuilding' is defined on the national level, rather than the local level, and refers generally to post-conflict societies, a term whose defects will be described shortly. Each of the four broad standards corresponds to a disciplinary tradition and policy/institutional perspective: security, society, politics or economics. Each standard has its own deficiencies, including difficulty of measurement.

I argue here that developing agreed-upon definitions of peacebuilding success is useful. The burgeoning peacekeeping and peacebuilding industries cost billions of dollars each year, mostly in places where wars have ended but sustained peace remains questionable. Without knowing what degree and kind of 'peace' these operations seek, effective strategies are problematic. Although bureaucratic imperatives and interests ensure that no complete agreement on standards of success will prevail, greater clarity about the choices confronting international actors should help clarify debates over these operations. Moreover, examining trends in peace across the globe requires some shared understanding of what is being measured.

To be specific, I argue that one approach to measuring success – the so-called root causes, like poverty and unemployment – are risk factors that shape outcomes, but not themselves indicators of peacebuilding success or failure. I advance a standard that combines the absence of high levels of political violence with minimal political institutions capable of resolving social conflicts peaceably. At the same time, policymakers should refrain from letting specific indicators of participation or institutional capacity overly define their priorities. The primacy of security and institutional standards of peacebuilding success require processes designed to confront the primary and immediate threats to peace in a specific context, not solely risk factors. Although war recurrence lends itself to cross-national standards for participation and institutional strength, decisionmakers in post-war societies should be wary of letting standardised indicators of participation and state capacity drive them from context-specific strategies to institutionalise conflict-resolution mechanisms.

FOUR STANDARDS OF PEACEBUILDING SUCCESS

'Peacebuilding' is a term that has multiple and confused meanings. It may refer to local-level or discrete efforts to heal divisions over ethnic or other differences. It may refer to reorienting economic development efforts so as to ameliorate social conflicts

that never become violent. Here the term refers to the efforts to address societies that have experienced civil wars or other significant armed conflicts.

The term 'peacebuilding' entered public usage through UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* in 1992. The work defined 'peacebuilding' largely in relation to a conflict continuum.² Passing from pre-conflict prevention to peacemaking and then peacekeeping, the Agenda for Peace associated peacebuilding with post-conflict societies, defining it as 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.'³

The term 'post-conflict' can be as misleading and confusing as 'peacebuilding,' but is useful when properly defined. It is used in three main ways. First, 'post-conflict' refers most usefully to the period when one form of high-profile political violence comes to a virtual end, either through a negotiated settlement among the main protagonists or through military defeat. This usage applies to the Axis powers after 1945, El Salvador after 1991, Bosnia after 1995, Guatemala after 1996, Mozambique after 1992, and Kosovo after 1999, inter alia.

The concept is useful in such circumstances because the termination of political violence implies certain features or challenges that tend to be quite common. These include the formation or reinforcing of political rules that were previously contested by the armed groups, a need to demobilise one or more parties to the armed conflict, the potential return of displaced populations, renegotiating the institutions of security to alleviate the fears of former combatants and their constituents, demands to remedy injustices committed in the context of political violence, and certain opportunities to rebuild economic infrastructure damaged by war.

Although not all societies emerging from political violence share all these challenges, enough do so as to justify the cluster of characteristics of 'post-conflict' societies. Poor countries or weak states that are not emerging from political violence do not share this bundle of challenges in the same way; hence, the term 'post-conflict' is useful. Exactly which factors operate differently in post-conflict versus non-post-conflict countries, and to what extent, remains the subject of research.

Two other meanings have undermined the utility of the term 'post-conflict.' Both reflect the mistaken conflation of apparent changes with the actual significant reduction of one form of political violence – i.e., they confuse form with substance. Some use the term to refer to societies that have signed a formal peace agreement, even where the political violence that the peace agreement was designed to end has not been significantly diminished. In this second usage, post-conflict really means post-accord, and where the violence is not reduced, then the use of the term 'post-conflict' can inspire anger and resentment. Nevertheless, the implementation of certain provisions of a not-yet-successful peace accord may warrant the use of 'post-conflict', even where the same form of political violence persists.

Third, 'post-conflict' is used to refer to the apparent military defeat of one side in an armed conflict, but more particularly the fall of a regime associated with that army. The fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq conform to this definition. However, the continuance of organised

political violence, especially when the defeated regime persists in the same political violence from outside the halls of power, may also inspire resentment and confusion at use of the term ‘post-conflict’.

Again, the challenges of addressing society and state in the wake of regimes that have been driven from power tend to share certain features. These features include: the formation of a new political basis for governing (at least among the victors), the need to reformulate former insurgent armies into a new legitimate and effective state security force responsible for the entire territory, and the challenges of either confronting or welcoming the constituent population identified with the defeated regime, and the challenges of confronting the international post-conflict machinery.

In this sense, the challenges of defeated regimes overlap with, but are not coterminous with, the challenges of post-conflict societies as described in the first definition given above. Obviously, the simultaneous use of these three definitions of ‘post-conflict’ can be misleading, especially when other forms of violence – social, economic, or even new forms of political violence – emerge alongside the prior political violence.

Finally, the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding is confusing as it overlaps with, but does not precisely coincide with alternative terms used by international organisations and academic analysis. Overlapping terms and concepts include ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ (used by the World Bank), ‘reconstruction and stabilisation’ (used by the US government), ‘transitions’ (used by the UN Development Group and USAID), ‘conflict recovery’ (used by UNDP), ‘nation-building’ (used in popular US discourse), ‘state-building’ (used especially by US and European academics), and ‘civilian crisis management’ (used by the EU).⁴ Although some international institutions and scholars use these terms interchangeably, they refer to slightly different phenomena, reflecting different underlying values ranging from Western security interests to alleviating poverty in the developing world.

NO WAR RECURRENCE (A SECURITY PERSPECTIVE)

The signal indicator of peacebuilding failure is the reversion to armed conflict. Virtually all international and national agencies who work in post-conflict peacebuilding find agreement on this indicator of failure. Initial discussions of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, formed in 2006, reflected a concern about preventing reversion to war as the top priority.

An emphasis on preventing civil war recurrence reflects an emphasis on order and stability, as opposed to privileging poverty or development, justice, human freedom, empowerment or equity. As such, war recurrence represents a conservative, or minimalist, standard, one which subordinates other values to the preservation of internal order. Of the standards examined here, it is closest to Galtung’s ‘negative’ peace, which sees peace as the absence of warfare rather than the presence of other values that support and sustain an absence of violence.⁵

Scholars have devoted increasing attention to the topic of war recurrence, though less than the issue of civil war onset. Nevertheless, what we know about war

recurrence remains inadequate and contested. First is the issue of the rate of recurrence. Several quantitative studies have sought to identify the risk of failure and the universe of cases of civil war recurrence.

However, these studies use different criteria for inclusion in their lists of civil wars (extending to complex combinations of specified levels of combat deaths over a certain time span, involving certain types of actors in specified territories, etc.), cover different time spans (ranging from 12 years to almost 60 years), and use divergent lapses for gauging war recurrence (ranging from two years to any time in the period covered).

Economist Paul Collier, whose work has significantly influenced policy discussions of reversion rates, directly shaped estimates of civil war recurrence that were higher than he now estimates. In 2002 Collier and Hoeffler stated that ‘shortly after a conflict, on average, countries face a 50 percent risk of renewed conflict during the next five years.’⁶

Their more influential work, with others, for the World Bank in 2003 used a lower figure: countries face a 44 percent chance of civil war recurrence within five years.⁷ By 2006, two studies by Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom reflected even lower estimates. The studies find the chance of war recurrence within four years to be 21 percent and 23 percent, respectively, and chances of recurrence within ten years to be 34 percent and 40 percent, respectively.⁸

The research to date reveals a high variation in predicted rates of war recurrence. Many studies utilise a five-year lapse for gauging war recurrence. Part of the logic here is that two years seems too short a time period to declare success, and ten or more years seems too long to be sure that any new war actually reflects the factors associated with a prior peacebuilding effort.

By ‘war recurrence,’ here I refer to the chances that a country that has already experienced a civil war (internationalised or not) will experience another in a given time period.⁹ Collier and his colleagues’ work alone show a variation between 21 percent and 50 percent for war recurrence rates, though the later analysis would presumably be more reliable. Suhrke and Samset charge Collier and his colleagues of inflating the war recurrence rate, finding a five-year recurrence rate of 26 percent using only a simple method on Collier and Hoeffler’s own 2002 dataset.¹⁰

Two other scholars find higher rates of war recurrence, but both examine whether civil wars ever recur over the time span covered, in both cases around 50 years (from the mid-1940s to the mid-1990s). Walter finds a 36 percent relapse rate for civil wars for the entire period covered,¹¹ and Fortna finds a 41 percent rate of recurrence.¹² The various studies indicate that a country that has experienced civil war faces a 21–26 percent chance of recurrent civil war within five years, and a 35–40 percent chance of relapse within 50 years.¹³

Other recent research analyses the recurrence of war under specific circumstances: after a negotiated agreement to end the war. By focusing exclusively on ceasefires or broader peace agreements addressing some of the perceived causes of warfare, these scholars provide a subset of knowledge pertinent to the many wars that end in such agreements, rather than in outright military victories or by petering out.

Licklider, Fortna, and Mack, drawing on different datasets, have all found that negotiated settlements fail at markedly higher rates than outright victories.¹⁴ Licklider finds war recurrence within five years in only 15 percent of cases of outright victory by either side, whereas Mack found recurrence in even fewer cases: 9 percent. In cases of negotiated agreements ending civil wars, however, Licklider found a 50 percent recurrence rate, and Mack a 44 percent recurrence rate. Some speculate that the defeat of an enemy force undermines both the incentive and the capacity for relaunching military operations. By contrast, negotiated agreements may be tactical moves in preparation for renewed offensives, where actors have not suffered the loss of legitimacy brought about by defeat.

These scholarly sources contrast with what is arguably an important security-oriented measure of peacebuilding success: whether or not the international community must launch a new military deployment to restore order in a purportedly post-war society. For Western military establishments and for UN peacekeeping planners, this measure is an implicit, but important, standard of peacebuilding failure.

The political significance of inadequate governance and the expense of UN peacekeeping operations (over US\$5bn globally in 2006, not counting regional organisations' operations such as in Kosovo¹⁵) make the need to deploy troops one of the most important decisions faced by policymakers in the realm of international peace and security. The recurrence of civil war in Liberia in 2003, after the UN Operation in Liberia (UNOMIL, 1993–97) had successfully helped make and build peace after the 1990–97 war, epitomises this failure.

Table 1 lists countries that experienced repeat UN peacekeeping deployments, including those where civil war might not have recurred.¹⁶ A review of all UN peacekeeping operations deployed to civil wars between 1987 and July 2007 shows a remarkably high rate of non-recurrent UN troop deployments: 82 percent success (14 of 17). Three cases (18 percent) illustrate the failure of a peacebuilding process by this criterion: East Timor, Liberia and Haiti.

In each case, the international community closed peacekeeping operations convinced that it had achieved some degree of success in ending a war and helping install a legitimately elected government, only to have armed conflict break out within five years. Of course, the 82 percent success figure excludes five peacekeeping operations that never were able to establish peace in the first place, rendering war recurrence null. It also does not pick up the dramatic peacekeeping failure represented by Rwanda's 1994 genocide. In addition, two peace operations – Somalia in 1995 and Angola in 1999 – ended without redeployments even though peace had not yet been achieved (perhaps out of international exhaustion after glaring failures and especially US reluctance to risk its soldiers' lives).¹⁷

Using the lack of a need to deploy a new UN peacekeeping mission as a standard of success is not only minimalist, but highly imperfect. Methodologically, analysing only UN operations selects only those cases which might have greater chance of success and where international resources arguably made success more likely.

TABLE 1
PEACEBUILDING SUCCESSES AND FAILURES, RATED BY WHETHER NEW UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS WERE REQUIRED WITHIN FIVE YEARS

Peacekeeping failures (No PB rating)	Peacebuilding failures (<i>N</i> = 3, or 18%)	Peacebuilding successes (<i>N</i> = 14, or 82%)		Ongoing missions (@ 30 July 2007) (Too Soon to Rate)	
UNAVEM II (Angola)	UNMISSET (East Timor)	UNMIBH (Bosnia)	MINUGUA (Guatemala)	MONUC (DRC)	UNMIK (Kosovo)
UNAVEM III (Angola)	MIPONUH (Haiti)	ONUB (Burundi)	ONUMOZ (Mozambique)	UNMIL (Liberia)	UNMIS (Sudan)
UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone)	UNOMIL (Liberia)	UNTAC (Cambodia)	UNTAG (Namibia)	UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire)	
UNOSOM I (Somalia)		MINURCA (C.A.R.)	UNAMIR (Rwanda)	UNFICYP (Cyprus)	
UNPROFOR (FRY)		ONUCA (Nicaragua)	UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone)	UNMIT (Timor-Leste)	
		UNMOP (Croatia)	UNTAES (E. Slavonia)	UNOMIG (Georgia)	
		ONUSAL (El Salvador)	UNMOT (Tajikistan)	MINUSTAH (Haiti)	

Table 2 represents an attempt to refine this approach slightly. The table examines whether the Uppsala Conflict Data Project shows a recurrence of armed conflict within five years of the termination of a UN peacekeeping operation. The UN operation had to have pertained to an internal war and have ended amidst a perception of success (i.e., a lack of active warfare and a lack of an expectation of imminent warfare). In order to prevent double counting, 'rollover' missions, where a renamed mission's mandate changed not due to problems (either a security crisis or war recurrence) are excluded, counted only through the final incarnation of the UN operation.

Table 2 demonstrates a moderate success rate from the narrow standard of recurrence of armed conflict. Sixty percent of UN peacekeeping operations that ended their missions claiming to have fulfilled their mandate experienced no recurrence of even minor armed conflict within five years.

These successes include operations generally considered successful within the UN Secretariat – Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala, Tajikistan, Croatia and Eastern Slavonia. Forty percent of UN peacebuilding operations (6 of 15) experienced recurrent warfare, usually on a minor scale. Those classified as peacebuilding failures by this standard include cases often deemed mixed outcomes such as Cambodia and East Timor,¹⁸ but also the large-scale renewed violent warfare in Rwanda and Liberia in the late 1990s.¹⁹

Perhaps surprisingly, even selecting only cases where the Security Council committed troops for an international operation, the recurrence of armed conflict occurred at a higher rate (40 percent) than found in the civil war datasets analysed above (between 21 percent and 34 percent). Part of this discrepancy lies in the low

TABLE 2
PEACEBUILDING SUCCESSES AND FAILURES, RATED BY WHETHER UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS ENDED WITH PEACE BUT SAW RENEWED ARMED CONFLICT WITHIN FIVE YEARS

Peacekeeping failures (No PB rating)	Peacebuilding failures (<i>N</i> = 6, or 40%)	Peacebuilding successes (<i>N</i> = 9, or 60%)		Too soon to say (Less than 5 years passed @ July 2007)	
UNAVEM I & II (<i>Angola</i>)	UNTAET-UNMISSET (<i>East Timor</i>)	UNMIBH (<i>Bosnia</i>)	MINUGUA (<i>Guatemala</i>)	MONUC (<i>DRC</i>)	UNMIK (<i>Kosovo</i>)
UNAVEM III-MONUA (<i>Angola</i>)	UNMIH-MIPONUH (<i>Haiti</i>)	UNTAG (<i>Namibia</i>)	ONUMAZ (<i>Mozambique</i>)	UNMIL (<i>Liberia</i>)	UNMIS (<i>Sudan</i>)
UNOMSIL (<i>Sierra Leone</i>)	UNOMIL (<i>Liberia</i>)	ONUCA (<i>Nicaragua</i>)	ONUSAL (<i>El Salvador</i>)	UNFICYP (<i>Cyprus</i>)	ONUB (<i>Burundi</i>)
UNOSOM I & II (<i>Somalia</i>)	UNTAC (<i>Cambodia</i>)	UNMOP (<i>Croatia</i>)	UNTAES (<i>E. Slavonia</i>)	UNOCI (<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>)	UNMIT (<i>E. Timor</i>)
UNPROFOR (<i>FRY</i>)	MINURCA (<i>C.A.R.</i>)	UNMOT (<i>Tajikistan</i>)		UNOMIG (<i>Georgia</i>)	MINUSTAH (<i>Haiti</i>)
	UNAMIR (<i>Rwanda</i>)			UNAMSIL (<i>Sierra Leone</i>)	

Notes: Includes all peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN Security Council and overseen by UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, initiated after 1987, excluding the five missions deployed for interstate/border disputes; excluding UNPREDEP in Macedonia as a preventive rather than post-conflict mission; and excluding eight immediately prior 'rolled over' missions, whose outcomes are thus assessed jointly with the successors listed above (e.g., UNMIH-UNSMIH-UNTMIH-MIPONUH). See Appendix A, available from author, for details. Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping operations website, (accessed 22 Jul. 2007). We used the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset to verify whether armed conflict recurred within five years of the year of mission termination. 'Minor' armed conflict = 25–999 battle deaths. 'Civil War' = 1,000+ battle deaths, *inter alia*. Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP)/International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset, Oslo, Version 4-2006, UCDP website, (accessed 30 Jul. 2007). Thanks to Yolande Bouka for research assistance on the tables.

threshold used for armed conflicts in Table 2: 25 battle deaths, versus the 1,000 battle deaths used in the wider civil war datasets. Only one peacebuilding failure (Rwanda) would have been recorded using the standard of 1,000 annual battle deaths within five years of successful mission completion – yielding a peacebuilding success rate of 94 percent.

However, it would be misleading to lump the disappointing missions in East Timor, Haiti, Liberia and the Central African Republic with successes like El Salvador and Mozambique just because the casualties of war recurrence did not reach 1,000 in a single year.

In general, the security perspective emphasising the absence of war recurrence yields relatively high success rates. The full literature shows rates of war recurrence within five years ranging from 18 percent (Table 1) to 50 percent²⁰ – equivalent to success rates of 50–82 percent. If we draw only on more recent studies by Collier and colleagues and use the more rigorous war recurrence standard (see Table 2) rather than new UN deployments (Table 1), then the success rates range from 60 percent (Table 2) to 77 percent,²¹ depending on the standard adopted and the units of analysis (countries, wars or UN operations) chosen.

Consideration of some of the ‘successes’ under these criteria permits a basic security calculation, but does not necessarily get at the factors underlying the war and whether these have been addressed. Moreover, even this most easily measured standard suffers from evident measurement flaws! The next standard moves to the opposite extreme in considering such factors.

ROOT CAUSES (A SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE)

If short-term war recurrence represents the minimal standard for peacebuilding success, then addressing the ‘root causes’ of conflict stand at the opposite, maximalist, extreme. Over time, UN Security Council statements and other UN documents have increasingly embraced some form of the root-cause standard for peacebuilding outcomes. This statement by the President of the Security Council in February 2001 illustrates the expansion of the concept:

The Security Council recognises that peace-building is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence.²²

The quote above, with its checklist of factors to address in UN peacebuilding efforts, exemplifies the first of two kinds of the ‘root causes’ approach. This first sort

refers to *generalised* root causes, analysing causes and prescribing solutions across all countries and regions. In this sense, it would be better referred to as ‘risk factors’ for armed conflict. Just as the causes of an individual’s illness rarely conform precisely to the risk factors culled from medical research, the underlying causes of any specific conflict rarely conform to the risk factors identified by cross-national research. This universalist standard also reflects more of an emphasis on the social level, on the relations among social groups and their relationship to power and economic opportunity.

This first type of a root-causes perspective is broader than the second, which addresses the underlying causes of each *particular* conflict. Such an approach seeks to identify both proximate and potential root causes of armed conflict. One recent scholarly analysis represents this root-causes approach: Roland Paris’s *After Wars End*. Paris’s standard for peacebuilding success is the ‘achievement of a stable and lasting peace ...’,²³ a goal he sees as reflecting UN practice.²⁴ He explicitly rejects a focus on short-term war recurrence in favour of one which addresses the underlying causes of armed conflict. He criticises the work of George Downs and Stephen Stedman, whose work falls in the security approach of focusing on preventing a reversion to war:

... by focusing solely on whether fighting recurs in the short run, the Downs-Stedman formula deflects attention from the question of whether or not peacebuilders successfully address the underlying sources of conflict, which the UN also views as essential to the establishment of a self-sustaining peace.²⁵

Paris makes the case for the advantages of this more ambitious standard. It makes little sense to expend hundreds of millions of dollars so that renewed warfare will follow the withdrawal of international troops or other personnel. He writes that ‘any serious evaluation of the effectiveness of peacebuilding should include a consideration of why civil violence erupted in the first place, and whether the conditions that gave rise to this violence have been ameliorated through peacebuilding.’²⁶

Nevertheless, the disadvantages of the root-causes approach are serious. The generalised root-causes approach, as exemplified by the UN Security Council President’s laundry list of liberal goods, is as unrealistic as it is difficult to measure. Although one may value ‘sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law ...’, this ambitious concept-by-committee neither helps set operational priorities nor provides realistic standards of success. Given how few countries have achieved even one of these – i.e., the eradication of poverty and inequality – it is unhelpful to put forth this concept as a yardstick for success.

As for the particularist version of root causes, Paris’s own work reflects the blunt instrument evaluation becomes when so few cases make the mark. Paris only finds that Namibia and Croatia rate as qualified successes in post-conflict peacebuilding and that the other nine major UN peacebuilding operations all fall short of creating stable and lasting peace.²⁷ Based on his 11 selected cases, the success rate amounts to only 22 percent, much lower than the 60–80 percent success rate for non-war recurrence.

Yet how useful is a standard that lumps together clear failures such as Liberia, moderate successes like Cambodia and Bosnia and widely accepted successes like El Salvador and Guatemala?²⁸ Given the ongoing constraints confronting international agencies engaged in peacebuilding, does it make sense to hold a standard that will very rarely be met? Other problems exist with the root causes approach.

Conceptually, we know that many post-conflict countries (e.g., Guatemala) have failed to address the root causes of war, but have not experienced a reversion nor is there one on the horizon. Furthermore, the difficulty of successfully diagnosing the 'underlying causes' is one that, despite improvements in conflict analysis, remains a tricky business. Policy analysis exhibits a tendency to define root causes based on post hoc identification of short-term factors or as every potential social ill. Finally, how realistic is it to expect peacebuilders to address root causes of armed conflict that exist outside the state, whether in predatory neighbours, neoliberal economic policies that exacerbate inequality, or Western-driven natural resource markets that elicit violent competition?

LEGITIMATE REGIMES, EFFECTIVE STATES (A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE)

A third perspective on peacebuilding success has gained traction in recent years: one focused on the character of the regime or the state, rather than on the security situation or particular characteristics of the conflict or economy. A recent book on peacebuilding adopts this political perspective: 'Just as civil war is about failures of legitimate state authority, civil peace is about its successful reconstruction.'²⁹

Peacebuilding as Participation or Democratisation

This political approach takes two main forms. The first focuses on the legitimacy of the post-conflict regime: Is it reasonably participatory? Or, is it a democracy? One of the assumptions of peacekeeping policy during the early 1990s was that elections could serve as a conflict management tool, ending civil wars by peacefully settling the question of who should rule. By this thinking, elections dissuade losers from taking up arms while undermining any popular support for the losing party once a free and fair election transpires. Although this logic apparently reflected the peace process in Nicaragua in 1990,³⁰ the return to war by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces in Angola once he lost the 1991 presidential election exposed the flaws of seeing elections as the culmination of a successful peace process.

Nevertheless, legitimacy remains an important marker of peacebuilding success both conceptually and operationally. One UN report explicitly includes participatory governance as a condition of sustainable peace:

A sustainable domestic peace . . . becomes sustainable, not when all conflicts are removed from society, but when the natural conflicts of society can be resolved peacefully through the exercise of State sovereignty and, generally, participatory governance.³¹

Present-day international peace operations require, as a *sine qua non* for conclusion and withdrawal, some form of participation in the selection of a permanent government (and often of an interim administration). Despite widespread agreement that elections can be harmful and fall short of constituting a legitimate regime, the salient marker of legitimacy remains the election of a constitutionally empowered national government. The sequencing of this process has become subject to flexibility, as has its form. Thus regional consultations might precede the selection of an interim government (as in Afghanistan in 2002), as may local elections, as occurred in East Timor.³²

Conceptually, a standard that emphasises participation links peace to how much the state is seen as legitimate and represents disparate social groups. Operationally the standard has the advantage of being visible: whether it be a national consultation of a national election, everyone inside and outside the country knows when such an event has taken place.

Its disadvantages include its reliance on a blunt instrument: a single national participatory event – usually an election. As we know from cases such as Angola in 1991, elections can also spark renewed conflict.³³ They can also convey internal and external legitimacy on spoilers, those who actively undermine political or social reconciliation, or who exclude or repress former enemies. Bosnia's first post-Dayton elections, Haiti's elections of 2000 and 1995, Cambodia's elections and Liberia's elections of 1997 all provide examples of internationally recognised elections whose outcomes complicated or undermined peace.

One recent book, Doyle and Sambanis's *Making War, Building Peace*, represents the most serious quantitative effort yet to measure peacebuilding successes beyond war recurrence.³⁴ Doyle and Sambanis examined all 121 civil wars that had begun and ended between 1945 and 1999, assessing peacebuilding success using a more ambitious definition of peace, since 'higher-order peace cannot be based on the complete exclusion or repression of a group of citizens.'³⁵

Peacebuilding 'failed' if war or significant violence occurred within two years, if sovereignty was divided, or if the independent 'Polity' dataset scored a regime as extremely authoritarian or repressive. By including a minimal measure of participation, Doyle and Sambanis found a failure rate of 69 percent, understandably higher than more simple war recurrence measures, but lower than Paris' root-causes standard. A higher standard, such as a fully democratic regime or a certain level of regime legitimacy or support as expressed in public opinion surveys, would presumably yield an even higher failure rate for peacebuilding efforts.

Peacebuilding as State-building

The second form of this political approach focuses on capacity of the state: is the post-conflict state capable of carrying out its minimal functions? In recent years, especially since the events of 9/11 brought 'state failure' to the fore of international security, the concept of state-building has become intertwined with peacebuilding.³⁶ Fukuyama stated in 2004 that 'state-building is one of the most important issues for the world community

because weak or failed states are the source of many of the world's most serious problems.³⁷ In reacting against the neglect of state institutions, intergovernmental agencies embraced state-building as a central feature of post-conflict peacebuilding.³⁸

In practical terms, peacebuilders increasingly defined success in terms of leaving behind a sustainable state or self-sustaining state institutions. One senior DPKO official, for example, stated that

The exit strategy used to be elections, but now is really the capacity of new legitimate authorities. ... It is linked to the establishment of credible, professional and loyal army, police, extension of state authority throughout the country and the capacity to develop basic services, DDR, and resettlement of refugees and IDPs.³⁹

A legitimate, effective state is an attractive standard because it values sustainability more than simple elections or the absence of mass-level violence. To the extent that effective and legitimate states exist, then they are indeed likely to be able to mediate conflict in ways that mitigate violence.

At the same time, this standard has two flaws. First, it is hard for international or national actors to know when an effective and legitimate state when they see it, much less to agree upon it. Most analysts concur that a full Weberian state, with formal ministries that carry out their functions transparently, efficiently and accountably with reasonable equality across social groups, is not the appropriate standard. But if this standard is not appropriate, then what level of efficacy and legitimacy is? Aside from the holding of elections and a sense that violence is unlikely to break out upon withdrawal of international troops, international actors bring remarkably little clarity to this question.

One oft-used state-building standard is the 'restoration of state authority.' Yet even here, what that restoration looks like is either unclear or unsatisfying. In Liberia, for instance, restoring state authority to the rural areas was a key indicator of UN mission success. Helping the state recover its pre-war ability to deliver services may not be very useful, since state performance was likely to have been inadequate and possibly an initial causal factor in the war.

However, in Liberia the actual UN standards fell short even of pre-war capacity. Three things constituted successful state restoration in a given locale: the reconstruction of the village building, ensuring that the police had some presence in the village and the physical return of the mayor to abide in the municipal seat.⁴⁰ The UN did not inquire into the capacity to deliver services or the legitimacy or representativity of the restored mayor. This operational standard clearly falls short of an effective and legitimate state.

Where does that leave the standard for state-building as peacebuilding? Although a plethora of indices exist for measuring governance, economic risk, democracy and freedom, fewer indices measure state institutions.⁴¹ The World Bank and some UN missions are seeking to develop manageable checklists for minimal state capacities in particular contexts. Former Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf

Ghani and associates have proposed 10 core state functions.⁴² Recent efforts by have yielded some measures of efficacy and efficiency of public institutions. These include the World Bank's Country Performance and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and checklists of state reforms from USAID, the Center for Strategic and International Studies/Association of the US Army.

Yet the challenges are manifold. Of the few state capacity indicators, most measure things that go beyond state institutional capacity, aggregating indicators of legitimacy, governance, or other policies. The World Bank's CPIA, for instance, includes whether governments adopt World Bank prescribed economic policies. They and many datasets of state strength conflate state capacity and governance, including indicators of participation, accountability and oversight. While such aggregation is not intrinsically bad, more narrow indicators of state capacity for conflict resolution (including core state functions such as ensuring security guarantees, managing public finance and administering justice) would prove more useful. We still have neither an agreed-upon template to measure overall state effectiveness and insufficient data on the long list of core state functions to assess relative state strength with reliability.

Furthermore, context is important and some state functions (e.g., security, or public finance) may be more crucial for peace in some countries than others. Western agencies also face a conundrum politically. Although international agencies must adopt moderate, non-Western standards of state authority to be realistic, they cannot enunciate such lower standards without undermining their legitimacy or their ability to amass resources for peacebuilding.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY (AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE)

A number of international actors cite economic recovery as their goal in post-conflict settings. It is not clear whether they believe that economic recovery constitutes successful, sustainable peace. However, the concept of economic recovery or reconstruction is remains the highest order objective of these programs and thus merits mention here.

Should economic recovery be a singular indicator of peace? Is peace realised once a certain level of economic recovery is reached? Even the most economic analysts would say probably not. Poverty and other socio-economic indicators are clearly correlated with the occurrence of civil war. Research indicates that some economic variables are stronger risk factors than certain political, cultural or social variables. Yet because these risk factors often fail to translate into armed conflict, they do not serve as an adequate indicator of the presence of peace. Peace is simply not the same thing as wealth or infrastructure or industrialisation or a healthy population.

It makes much more sense for international development and financial institutions to plan and implement programs in function of standards of peace that reflect the defining elements of peace – levels of organised violence and perhaps the stability of political authority. In fact, most development and economic literature on

post-conflict economic recovery implicitly or explicitly does so. Collier *et al.*'s *Breaking the Conflict Trap* examines the correlations between social, economic and political factors on the one hand, with rates of civil war occurrence as the dependent variable.⁴³

Their critics do likewise. They argue that international development actors design and implement their programs with insufficient attention to their impact on war recurrence, levels of potential organised violence, or the legitimacy and institutionality of the state. In recent years, much of the efforts of development and humanitarian international organisations has focused on getting these same organisations to revise their programs more toward peacebuilding and state-building, implicitly embracing violence and its institutionalised reduction or suppression as the standard of success – not economic indicators.

Even if the assumption that general levels of economic recovery are healthy for preventing renewed mass-level violence or political legitimacy (a questionable assumption for any given program in a given society), the standards for success of achieving this intermediate or correlative peacebuilding goal are underspecified. International agencies say little about what levels of economic recovery are sufficient for them to declare their programs successful.

One tacit measure would be the levels of economic performance seen before the war. However, most international development actors believe such a standard to be either too elusive or inappropriate. Furthermore, agencies generally fail to specify which indicators would be most appropriate: GDP, infrastructure reconstruction, employment rates, productivity, wage levels, or basic health and social indicators?

CONCLUSIONS

What can we conclude from these diverse standards of peacebuilding success? What implications do they hold for policymakers, especially within the UN system?

The four 'common' standards of success for post-war peacebuilding each yield different rates of failure and success. The most common standard – war recurrence – shows disparate rates of success, many of them based on the same cluster of economists' changing analysis over the past five years. That standard – recently ranging from 23 percent within five years to 39 percent (and conversely a 61–77 percent success rate) – derives from various quantitative methods analysing the entire pool (not just a sample) of civil wars over five decades. When one considers only negotiated settlements, the success rate for non-war recurrence is only 59 percent to 65 percent, as opposed to outright victories, which show higher success rates of 85 percent to 91 percent.

On the other hand, the political standard of state institutionalisation is still in its infancy. There are no widely shared standard by which to measure 'successful state-building' across cases of post-war countries and thus no reliable success rate (see Table 3 for summary of rates based on distinct standards).

In addition, isolated studies provide success rates reflecting either a 'root-causes' approach (Paris's 22 percent) or a political approach that combines war recurrence

and other organised violence with a non-autocratic regime (Doyle & Sambanis's 31 percent). Finally, the outcomes for economic recovery are unclear.

How are we to assess these standards? The plurality of success rates should not lead us to throw up our hands in despair, abandoning the judicious search for a widely shared standard. The disparate success rates *within* any given standard should prompt scepticism when we hear confident claims about what we know about that indicator. Here the multiple outcomes for 'war recurrence' should make us wary of high-*N* quantitative findings on this particular indicator. Serious problems plague both quantitative and qualitative research on war recurrence. Problems of method and measurement produce the diverse rates of war recurrence seen above, ranging from 20.6 percent to 50 percent.

How reliable can quantitative studies be if the same group of scholars report such variation in the rates of civil war recurrence? Paul Collier and various colleagues' recurrence rates dropped from 50 percent to less than half that portion (23.6 percent) in only four years' time, with nary a hint of uncertainty in any of five sources!⁴⁴ Part of this difference relates to the divergent methods used to calculate war recurrence rates. In addition, datasets reflect very different criteria for inclusion. Of 141 civil wars that began between 1944 and 1996 listed by Sambanis, for example, Fearon and Laitin include only 101 of these wars, while Walter includes only 64.⁴⁵ Rates of success and failure are less compelling when specialists disagree so seriously on what constitutes a civil war at all.

TABLE 3
PEACEBUILDING STANDARDS AND SUCCESS RATES

Peacebuilding standard adopted	Success rates	Sources
<i>Security standard</i>		
No civil war recurrence within four/five years	61–77 percent (was 50–66 percent in earlier estimates, now revised)	Collier <i>et al.</i> (both works in note 8); Collier <i>et al.</i> (note 7); Collier and Hoeffler (note 6); Suhrke and Samset (note 8)
No civil war recurrence ever (50+ years)	59–65 percent	Walter (note 11); Fortna (note 12)
No armed conflict for 5 years after "successful" Security Council-mandated UN peace operation	60 percent	This paper (see Table 2)
<i>Political standard</i>		
Neither large-scale violence nor rise of outright autocratic regime within 2 years	31 percent	Doyle and Sambanis (note 29)
Creation of effective and legitimate state	NA	Ghani <i>et al.</i> (note 42)
<i>Social standard</i>		
Root causes addressed (of 11 major UN peacebuilding operations)	22 percent	Paris (note 18)

Related to the problem of divergent methods and datasets is the lack of more discrete sets of generalisations based on similar sorts of civil wars. Large-*N* quantitative studies have the benefit of using methods that control for systematic differences among diverse social phenomena. Hence, risk factors for warfare derive from analysing over 100 civil wars with very different scales of affected territory (e.g., from Russia's relatively contained war in Chechnya to Liberia's 1990–97 civil war), different degrees of intensity (e.g., from 144 battle deaths in Chiapas to an estimated half a million direct and indirect deaths in Angola⁴⁶); different levels of involvement by external actors (e.g., from Cuba's relatively home-grown revolution to the US-funded war against Cuban-backed Nicaragua in the 1980s), etc.

Despite the utility of such analyses, international peacebuilding efforts would also benefit from research on the factors that shape similarly situated post-war situations. Such research necessarily would require more attention to similar cases, which points to the utility of qualitative research.

Yet our qualitative research is also deficient. We have numerous case-based comparative studies of post-war societies, but few focused specifically on war recurrence or the failure of peacebuilding. Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens examine cases in a rigorous framework, but focus only on cases of implementation of peace agreements⁴⁷ Paris includes 14 case studies of peacebuilding efforts, but only cases with major UN peacekeeping presence. Like Doyle and Sambanis and most case studies, neither of these books examined cases like Burma, Peru, Russia/Chechnya, or the Philippines, where the UN and international actors had little or no involvement in post-war activities. Other comparative studies, including Collier *et al.*'s *Understanding Civil Wars* and Chesterman *et al.*'s *Making States Work*, have looked at cases without major UN or intergovernmental involvement, but neither has focused exclusively on war recurrence.⁴⁸ We have little rigorous comparative work on civil war recurrence.

Yet freedom from war recurrence must be part of any standard of peace, including any broader 'positive' peace standard. Any notion of peace means little if persistent combat exists. Thus, the renewed outbreak of armed conflict is now and should remain the signal failure of any peacebuilding process, even as we accept that the quantitative claims bandied rest on far less sound science than is generally claimed. Social scientists and policymakers should approach our knowledge here with humility and caution.⁴⁹

Now let us turn to the question of what standards beyond war recurrence should be part of assessing success and failure in post-war peacebuilding? Values underlie our choices about standards for peacebuilding success. The least ambitious standard – war recurrence – reflects a privileging of order over equality, justice, empowerment, or prosperity, at least in the short run. The other common standards – root causes, sound governance, or economic well-being – reflect assumptions about how certain factors – e.g., inequality, political exclusion, weak institutions, or poverty – relate to peace.

Most standards for post-conflict success reflect a standard that is either explicit or (more often) implicit: that a society has consolidated peace once it demonstrates the

ability to resolve social conflicts without large-scale violence. The difficulty lies in markers: how do we know when a society or country can sustainably resolve conflicts without armed conflict? All of the standards in use – democratic regimes, a viable state and even sound economic policies that produce growth – reflect different proxies for a society's conflict-resolving capability. Ideally we would specify more discrete measures of a society's capacity for resolving conflicts.

Do root causes approaches meet this need? To the extent root causes are generalised risk factors, they not indicators of successful or unsuccessful outcomes, but rather independent variables that influence outcomes. Reducing risk factors for war recurrence or other indicators of sustainable peace is generally positive, all other factors being equal. However, all things are rarely equal and measures to reduce risk factors, such as reducing poverty or addressing a youth bulge, may prove harmful and thus should be weighed against their potential adverse effects. The point here is that a generalised 'root causes' standard is not meaningful. It translates to the following: Peace exists to the extent that poverty has been reduced by a certain margin. Or peace exists to the extent that youth have been employed at a certain rate? Risk factors must be addressed as they can reduce the likelihood of war recurrence, but they should not be confused with indicators of success.

To the extent that 'root causes' are specific to a society, then this standard makes more sense. Addressing the causes of conflict, rather than the symptoms would logically reduce the chances of war recurrence. But should efforts to foster peace be seen as a failure if they fail to remedy the various original causes of war? Again, values underlie this judgement, but we have numerous examples of sustained peace in the absence of addressing the root causes of a war – El Salvador, Mozambique, South Africa among them. In addition, national and international resources are limited and almost always inadequate to address the original causes of any given society's war. Even if decisionmakers tend to unwisely privilege immediate threats to peace over long-term threats in allocating resources, adhering to a scheme that applies resources strictly to root causes will likely prove self-defeating. Even with international funding, national efforts to addressing the underlying causes of post-war tensions in Afghanistan, Sudan, or the DRC would probably yield negligible progress on each factor. If one accepts the inadequacy of resources and will for addressing post-conflict needs, then strategic deployment of resources requires more modesty in standards of success. Furthermore, the root causes of a conflict may not be the factors that pose a risk to a subsequent peace. Scholarship has yet to determine the extent to which the causes of civil war are the same causes of war recurrence.

What seems to make sense is to build in minimal indicators of a capacity to resolve conflicts peacefully. Ideally, such a standard would include the extent to which institutions are actually capable of resolving social conflicts, as well as the extent to which governance is structured so as not to fuel renewed conflict. In other words, war recurrence plus some indicators of minimal state institutionalisation and minimal participation by salient social groups.

When it comes to participation and state institutions, the problem remains the lack of discriminating and universal markers gauging the capacity for conflict

resolution. Widely used scales of freedom or regime type, such as the Polity dataset or Freedom House, are helpful and cover virtually all the world's countries; however, they are not fully satisfying in measuring the extent to which salient social groups feel sufficiently invested in the polity to not take up arms.

The deficiencies of measures of states and their institutions are more serious. As indicated earlier, these indices are few and inadequate. Many of the checklists developed by donors include measures of institutional reforms, rather than outcomes of internationally supported initiatives. One of the important challenges in examining whether a society has institutions capable of resolving conflict peacefully is the prior assumption about which institutions are important for conflict resolution. In some societies, state judicial systems are the locus of non-violent conflict resolution, whereas in others, social norms and locally legitimate authorities play a crucial role. Effective systems of conflict prevention may involve policing practice.

These practices point to the centrality of the rule of law. Yet even if the rule of law is seen as the central institutional system for conflict resolution, culturally specific understandings of where justice and security are maintained involve differing agencies of the state, with different relationships, articulated with traditional or informal systems of justice that vary tremendously from one society to another. Although international organisations benefit greatly from developing standardised indicators and templates for efficiently responding to problems in numerous countries, the logic of such cosmopolitan approaches contradict locally specific cultural exigencies.

How to square the need for context-specificity with the importance of measurable standards to assess trends in peacebuilding across the globe? Here I have shown the deficiencies of these global standards, but support continued efforts to seek and hone such standards. Scholars and international bureaucracies should continue to develop indicators of democratic governance, participatory politics, state institutional effectiveness, applying them across countries, even as they convey the shortcomings of their assessments.

At the same time, the flaws of the available global assessment tools mean that they should not serve as the unyielding guideposts for developing strategies in any specific country. National-level decisionmakers, be they elites or masses, state or non-state actors, must ascertain which institutions will be the most effective in preventing and resolving conflicts in their own society before they become violent. These often will not correspond to the indicators utilised by social scientists. For both these national-level actors and international policymakers, avoiding war recurrence and developing adequate institutions for resolving conflicts peaceably will require context-specific understandings and action.

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NOTES

1. Because these countries' cease-fires did not survive for one year, they are classified here as *peacekeeping* failures than *peacebuilding* failures. Although different terms are used in multiple and confusing ways, the concept of peacebuilding used here requires a short-term cease-fire to exist in the first place in order to be sustained (or not).
2. For earlier use, see Johan Galtung, 'Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding' in his *Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research, Vol. 2* (Copenhagen: Christian Eljers 1975) pp.282–304.
3. Boutros Boutros Ghali. 'An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping', Report to United Nations Security Council, 17 Jun. 1992.
4. For definitions and discussion, see Charles T. Call and Elizabeth Cousens, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace', *International Studies Perspectives* 9 (Feb. 2008) Table 1.
5. Galtung (note 2).
6. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'The Incidence of Civil War in Africa', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46/1 (Feb. 2002) p.17.
7. Paul Collier *et al.*, *Breaking the Conflict Trap* (Oxford: Oxford UP and the World Bank 2003).
8. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom, *Aid, Policies and Risks in Post-Conflict Societies*, Working Paper (Oxford: Oxford Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford Univ., Jun. 2006); Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom, *Post-Conflict Societies*, Working Paper CSAE WPS 2006-12 (Oxford: Oxford Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford Univ., Aug. 2006). See Astri Suhrke and Ingrid Samset, 'What's in a Figure: Estimating Recurrence of Civil War', *International Peacekeeping* 14/2 (Apr. 2007) p.198.
9. As Suhrke and Samset (*ibid.* p.197) point out, the term also refers to whether a particular conflict (not country) will recur; to the risk of civil war in countries that have already experienced such conflicts versus those that have not; or to the risk of civil war recurrence within a subset of countries that have already experienced such wars.
10. *Ibid.* p.198.
11. Barbara F. Walter, 'Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War', *Journal of Peace Research* 41/3 (2004) p.371.
12. Virginia Page Fortna, 'Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?' *International Studies Quarterly* 2 (2004) pp.269–92.
13. After several UN documents reported that 'half' or 'nearly half' of ended civil wars revert to warfare within five years, several scholars sought to refine their analysis, resulting in lower estimations by 2007. See Kofi Annan, speech in Derry, Fall 2004.
14. Roy L. Licklider, 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars 1945–93', *American Political Science Review* 89/3 (1995) pp.681–90, 687; Fortna (note 12) p.288; Andrew Mack, 'Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline', Working Paper (New York: International Peace Academy Mar. 2007) p.5.
15. Figure from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website, <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q9.htm>> (accessed 17 Sept. 2007).
16. For example, Haiti's UN-sanctioned peacekeeping deployment and peacebuilding effort from 1994 to 2000, is considered a peacebuilding failure, even though the 1991–94 human rights atrocities and refugee crisis in Haiti was not necessarily a civil war. Nor did East Timor's violence in March 2006 amount to full-scale war.
17. See International Peace Research Institute's (PRIO) case summaries of armed conflicts, Angola section, para. 2; and Somalia section, yearly summaries that show no change from late 1994 through 1996. See also Uppsala Conflict Data Project classifications of each country.
18. See, e.g., Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2004), and Tanja Chopra and Edith Bowles, 'State-building after Independence: East Timor', forthcoming in Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth (eds) *Building States to Build Peace* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner).
19. Again, these peacebuilding failures exclude peacekeeping failures where missions ended amidst ongoing warfare like Angola in 1999; Somalia in 1995; and the former Yugoslavia in 1995.
20. Collier and Hoeffler (note 6).

21. See Collier *et al.* *Post-Conflict Societies* (note 8).
22. Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2001/5, 20 Feb. 2001.
23. Paris (note 18) p.56.
24. Paris distinguishes his standard from one that seeks to solve ‘all the country’s ills’ such as Galtung’s call to create ‘positive peace’ by addressing structural violence. Paris’ is a closer approximation to a root causes approach. *Ibid.* p.57.
25. *Ibid.* p.56.
26. *Ibid.* pp.56–7.
27. *Ibid.* pp. 151, 155. Paris at times seems to conflate evaluating national-level post-war peacebuilding processes with assessment of major UN peacebuilding operations, says that ‘some missions were clear successes (Namibia and Croatia); others were obvious failures (Angola and Rwanda). The remaining operations fell between these two extremes’. Yet his implications of the outcomes of the remaining seven missions – Bosnia, Cambodia, Liberia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua – reveal a negative assessment.
28. See also Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elisabeth Cousens, ‘Introduction’, in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elisabeth Cousens (eds) *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002).
29. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War, Building Peace* (Princeton: Princeton UP 2006), p. 69.
30. Robert A. Pastor, *Not Condemned to Repetition*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview P 2002).
31. Secretary-General of the United Nations, *No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, S/2001/394, 20 Apr. 2001, para. 10, <<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/343/62/PDF/N0134362.pdf?OpenElement>> .
32. Terrence Lyons, ‘Post-Conflict Elections: War Termination, Democratization and Demilitarizing Politics,’ Working Paper No. 20 (Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University Feb. 2002).
33. Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence* (New York: W. W. Norton 2000).
34. Doyle and Sambanis (note 29).
35. *Ibid.* p.73. They actually use two measures, one of which focuses on the renewal of large-scale organised violence only (closer to war recurrence). The other includes participation.
36. ‘Failed states’ entered the policy lexicon in the early 1990s. See Gerald B. Helman and Stephen Ratner, ‘Saving Failed States’, *Foreign Policy* 89 (Winter 1993) pp.3–21.
37. Francis Fukuyama, *State-building* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2004) p.1.
38. See Susan L. Woodward, ‘Fragile States’, Paper presented at the Peace and Social Justice meeting of the Ford Foundation, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 29 Nov. 2004.
39. Personal interview, UNHQ, New York, official requested anonymity, Dec. 2004.
40. Personal interviews with Gen. Jacques Paul Klein, Special Representative of the Secretary General, UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and with officials of the UNMIL Civil Affairs Unit, charged with restoration of state authorities, Monrovia, Aug. 2004.
41. For a description of dozens of governance indicators, see Marie Besancon, *Good Governance Rankings: The Art of Measurement*, World Peace Foundation Report No. 36 (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation 2003).
42. Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, and Michael Carnahan, ‘An Agenda for State-Building in the Twenty-first Century’, *Fletcher Forum for World Affairs* 30/1 (Winter 2006) p.111.
43. Paul Collier, Lani Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford UP 2003).
44. The five sources postulated 50 percent, 44 percent, 34 percent (all referring to a five-year time frame), 23.6 percent, and 26 percent (the latter referring to a four-year time frame). In personal correspondence in July 2007, Collier cited only reliance on different datasets or pools of civil wars.
45. Nicholas Sambanis, ‘What is a Civil War?’ *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48/6 (2004) pp.814–58; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, *American Political Science Review* 97/1 (2003) pp.76–90; Walter (note 11).
46. On Chiapas, see comparison of statistics in Centre for the Study of Civil War, ‘The Battle Deaths Dataset, 1946–2005, Version 2.0: Documentation of Coding Decisions’, updated Sept. 2006 by Bethany Lacima, <http://www.prio.no/csw/battle_deaths/Documentation_PRIO-UCDP.pdf> . On Angola, see Ploughshares, *Armed Conflict Reports: Angola* (Sept. 2003) p.4.

47. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elisabeth Cousens (eds) *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002); Paris (note 18); Doyle and Sambanis (note 29).
48. Paul Collier, and Nicholas Sambanis, *Understanding Civil War*, Vols I and II (Washington, DC: World Bank 2005); Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, *Making States Work* (Tokyo: UN UP 2005).
49. This is not to claim that war is never morally or politically justified.