

FEATURE REVIEW

The contemporary African state: neither African nor state

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La Greffe de l'Etat

Jean-François Bayart (ed)
Paris: Karthala, 1996
pp 404, FF180 pb

Africa's Management in the 1990s and Beyond: Reconciling Indigenous and Transplanted Institutions

Mamadou Dia
Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996
pp 293, \$21.95 pb

Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism

Mahmood Mamdani
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996
pp 353, \$55/£40, hb \$19.95/£14.95 pb

Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone

William Reno
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995
pp 229, \$57.95/£37.50 hb

The contemporary state in sub-Saharan Africa is not African. It descends from arbitrary colonial administrative units designed as instruments of domination, oppression and exploitation. No doubt after some 40 years of independence these states have been transformed, adopted, adapted, endogenised. Yet, their origin remains exogenous: European, not African, and set up against African societies rather than having evolved out of the relationships of groups and individuals in societies.

Nor is the African state a state. By the standards of Max Weber's classical definition, a state is 'a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory'.¹ Few would argue that, in many respects, most African states fail to meet these criteria: theirs is a dubious community of heterogeneous and occasionally clashing linguistic, religious and ethnic identities; their claim to force is rarely effective and much less monopolistic; their frequent predatory nature fails the test of legitimacy; and their territoriality is generally at best hesitant and contested.

In fact, it is *because* it is not African that the African state is not a state. In observing

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the numerous instances of state failure in Africa and the massive evidence of societal exit, it should be apparent that these pathologies derive from the very exogeneity of the state, its lack of embeddedness, its divorce from underlying norms and networks of social organisation. Patterns of predation, neo-patrimonialism, rent seeking, urban bias, and administrative decay can be thought of as deriving from the legitimacy deficit of the African state. To quote a prescient Chinua Achebe writing in 1966, problems of African development are linked to the fact that 'in the affairs of the nation there was no owner, the laws of the village became powerless'.²

Although couched here in slightly provocative ways, these hypotheses are generally accepted in the literature. Hence the abundance of alternative labels to capture the heterodoxy of the African state: juridical (as opposed to empirical) states, quasi-states, suspended states, collapsed states, weak states, imported states and lame Leviathans, to name but a few.³ Yet, under the yoke of an enduring modernisation paradigm reborn, Phoenix-like, in the contemporary guise of theories of governance and civil society, we avoid challenging the state and count upon societies to shoulder the burden of an inevitable state-society adjustment. Problems of development are therefore conceptualised in terms of societal shortcomings within an unquestioned state structure. When the state is challenged, criticism tends to be limited to deploring its lack of autonomy. But the very nature and existence of the contemporary African states have usually—albeit with some notorious exceptions—eluded theoretical questioning.⁴ Why did we thereby enshrine an arbitrary administrative colonial creation whose length of existence pales before the history of indigenous political institutions? Why did we conceptually endorse the crystallisation of these structures whereas we would acknowledge that states elsewhere are in constant motion and redefinition?

Each of the four excellent, intelligent and innovative books under review here belongs to the new generation of African studies in the sense that it tackles the state head on. The books' dependent variables differ: political stability (Bayart), the efficiency of state management (Dia), democracy (Mamdani) and the meaning of the informal sector (Reno). Yet they all point to the nature of the state as the crucial variable in understanding the deviances they observe. While Bayart alone minimises the obstacle represented by imported statehood, he, like the others, at least squarely faces the issue of the 'graft' (both as in skin graft, and as in corruption) of the state. And, as if to underline their emphasis, each author also coins his own new label: shadow state (Reno), rhizome state (Bayart⁵), bifurcated state (Mamdani) and disconnected state (Dia).

Two opposite views of the same reality

If, as recently as 1991, CS Whitaker could write that the World Bank 'insufficiently appreciated ... the extent to which the quality of the relationship between state and society in Africa, as opposed to concern with the capacity of state institutions as such, is crucial for both economic development and democratic political formation',⁶ this should no longer be true with the publication of Mamadou Dia's book. In and of itself, this is a sufficient enough accomplishment to justify its existence.

As a World Bank senior staffer,⁷ Dia has been involved since the early 1990s with the Bank's work on governance, civil service reform and indigenous management practices. He has challenged his colleagues to think beyond neoclassical paradigms and has repeatedly pleaded for explicitly taking into account, in Bank policy recommendations, the cultural dimension of economic and administrative behaviour.⁸ In this book, he pushes this reasoning further by addressing the nature of African public institutions.

Dia's main hypothesis is that 'the institutional crisis affecting economic management in Africa is a crisis of structural disconnect between formal institutions transplanted from

outside and indigenous institutions born of traditional African culture' (p vii). Disconnected institutions are inefficient because they fail to generate loyalty and ownership and are therefore presumably conducive to opportunism. The African state itself embodies these disconnected institutions. Its consequent lack of 'moral legitimacy' has led to patterns of neo-patrimonial and clientelistic rule (p 37). Indigenous institutions, on the other hand, display legitimacy, accountability and self-enforcement (p 1). What is needed in this schizophrenic institutional environment, Dia argues, is a process of 'institutional reconciliation'.

By making Africa's weak state capacity a function of the disconnectedness of the state, Dia essentially agrees with the premise of this review that the African state is a failed state because it is not African. In fact, this is probably one of the clearest-cut statements of this hypothesis I have ever come across. A consequent virtue of this book is that it establishes a dichotomy between the state and 'indigenous, informal institutions ... reflecting ... culture and tradition' (p 3), rather than between the state and a hypothetical civil society composed of voluntary associations and estranged from precolonial institutions. Do not be fooled by Dia's unorthodox labelling of indigeneous institutions as 'civil society'. What he is referring to are precolonial institutions rather than some Tocquevillian conception of a modernising civil society.

Yet, Dia does not fully capitalize on the promising theoretical start of *Africa's Management in the 1990s*. In fact, he rather quickly dilutes his hypothesis into other, somewhat discredited, theories. First, he slips from the exogenous-endogenous dichotomy into the modernity-tradition one. This leads him to argue that, although imported institutions must be reconciled with traditional ones, the latter nevertheless need to change if they are to become vectors of development. Indeed, 'informal institutions ... often harbor dysfunctional practices ... and do not always evolve in response to changes brought in from the rest of the world' (p 1). This is the well know—and mistaken—hypothesis of dynamic inefficiency of traditional institutions. Furthermore, Dia falls back into the modernisation pitfall of forced change imposed from outside when he warns that 'If these institutions continue to live in the past, they will be discarded as anachronistic relics' (p 33). But the renovation he wishes to impose would be yet another import and, as such, runs counter to the logic of his own argument. For it is a mistake to see the modern as dynamic and the traditional as static. Indigenous African institutions are themselves in constant evolution, as a function of changes in their environments, such as relative prices or relative resource scarcity. They may wither away or become agents of progress according to their own dynamics, as a transaction-cost perspective (which Dia invokes) would suggest, but their specific cultural contents are unlikely to play a decisive role in this.⁹

Second, when calling for imported institutions to be made more culturally relevant, Dia may sin by excessive generalisation. His vision of traditional political institutions as either large empires or small states dismisses altogether the numerous stateless societies of Africa. His claim that consensus, participation and representation were widespread also neglects the prevalence of slavery and other forms of domination among Africans (see p 39). Dia is also walking on eggs with the claim that Africans demand paternalistic structures of management. What would trade unions think of his statement that 'Effective African enterprise leaders—given the prevalence in African society of power distance, collectivism, and nurturing values—should be able to play the role of a kind and strict parent' (p 9)? Furthermore, if there is such a thing as a single African political or economic culture, and if it does matter to development, how does one account for the widespread variance in economic performance in Africa, from an average annual per capita 1960-92 rate of growth of about -2% for Chad to almost 5% for Botswana?¹⁰ Sticking to the institutionalist argument, and comparing African states in

terms of their 'degree of fitness' with underlying informal institutions, would have been a more powerful argument. It is unfortunate that Dia slips instead into a culturalist discourse.

There is much more of interest in this book, especially the fascinating surveys of civil service in Zambia and Ghana (pp 63–85), the discussion on the successful use of chieftaincy in Botswana and Ghana (pp 106–113), and the ample evidence of the prevalence of voluntary self-help organisations (chapter 4) which tend to confirm the existence of social capital in Africa and weaken the argument that state capacity is a function of the level of social capital.¹¹ Unfortunately, most of the insightful information of the book does not seem to result in meaningful policy prescriptions. The 'institutional reconciliation' paradigm is a hotch-potch of existing World Bank policies and lip-service payments to current developmental fads, and the call for further lending (a standard prescription in Bank's publications) is not substantiated.

On the perspective of the consequences of imported statehood, Bayart lies opposite Dia. His book *La Greffe de l'Etat* is an edited volume with an introductory chapter by himself on this very topic of 'the historicity of the imported state'.¹² I will concentrate here on this first essay, the only one in the book that directly deals with Africa. Other contributions look at the 'long-run trajectories' of statehood in Israel (going back to Adam and Eve!), the Maghreb, India (five essays) and China.

Bayart is a proponent of the idea that imported institutions become endogenised and that their imported nature ends up playing a relatively minor role in the long-run history of societies. Borrowing a conceptual distinction from John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman,¹³ he refuses to be blinded by the apparent failure of state 'construction' in Africa and sees the graft of the imported state as an element of the local process of state 'formation' a process which gives 'to a minority of autochthones the historical opportunity to use to their advantage the new institutions' (p 7). Hence, the imported state is hybridised with local strategies of power, reappropriated by local groups (p 14). This process began under colonial rule as the metropolitan powers concluded alliances with local groups in a bid to secure the stability of their domination. Thus Bayart proposes a Braudelian *longue durée* analysis of the African state as a substitute for the extraneity thesis. Such a focus would acknowledge the ruptures introduced by colonialism, but these would acquire their meaning only as 'a function of singular histories' (p 17), and no teleological conclusion should be derived from it (p 18, a jab aimed at dependency theories).

Bayart then suggests three methodologies to return the African state to its historicity. First, he proposes investigating the evolution of civilisations rather than the current state structures. In this perspective, the African postcolonial state is but a

new *avatar* in a multisecular trajectory characterised by—among other civilisation features such as orality, a limited development of productive forces, extensive agriculture and cattle raising without private appropriation of land tenure, a weak cultural and social polarisation—a low regime of economic accumulation and political centralisation, relying on the control of the rent from dependence vis-à-vis an external environment rather than on the intensive overexploitation of the dominated [classes] (p 21).

Second, he encourages us to identify the 'structural chain reactions through which social inequality is engendered' (p 24). This is the approach he followed in *The State in Africa* and which distinguishes three ideal-types of state construction: conservative modernisation, social revolution and reciprocal assimilation of elites.

Finally, he recommends the identification of the different cultural *répertoires* that contribute to shaping the state: 'the French-inspired jacobinist state, the British govern-

ment ... Islam, catholicism ... autochthonous repertoires of lineage or kingdom, the world of the invisible, prophetism ... ' (p 30).

As usual with Bayart, this is an essay of extremely high intellectual quality and breadth of knowledge. Yet it has several problems and contradictions. First, Bayart pays no attention to the consequences of state formation (the long-run historical process by which a hegemonic political project is developed) on state construction (the 'deliberate creation of an apparatus of political control', p 6) and on the capacity of the formal African state. The fact is, the process of state formation in the context of imported institutions results in the weakening of state construction and, therefore, of the formal state itself and of its capacity to design and implement policies for development. But this is of little interest to Bayart who professes disdain for the idea of development. Bayart finds the state 'extraneity' thesis erroneous and dangerous in its implications for the integrity of the African state, because it is in 'renouncing to revise the borders inherited from colonization and [in] the signing of the OAU Charter that African leaders managed at least to spare their continent a general deflagration in the wake of independences' (p 13). But did not the same policy lead, 40 years down the road, to collapsed states, ethnic conflicts (as acknowledged by Bayart, p 14), predatory rule and a general political alienation of grassroots Africans? It is hard, indeed, to argue that African leaders have spared their continent anything. Bayart's analysis would in fact gain from a distinction between the formation of power, of a dominant class, of hegemony, and of the state *per se*. The African hegemonic quest predates colonialism and uses the contemporary structures of statehood to its benefit. Yet, it does so—especially in cases of reciprocal assimilation of modern and traditional elites through neo-patrimonial means—at the expense of formal statehood. The state apparatus is indeed the victim of these strategies and the latter are therefore a prime reason for weak state capacity and underdevelopment in Africa.

Bayart is also adamant in his critique of the extraneous state theory because, in his mind, it denies the historicity of the African state. I do not believe that acknowledging the imported nature of an institution denies meaning and relevance to other dimensions of domestic history. It simply highlights the institutional clash, the moment of discontinuity in trajectories of African statehood, and contends that this historical event and, more importantly even, the choice of African leaders to retain these new structures upon the end of colonialism, have had far-reaching consequences on political and economic development in Africa. Many elements of Bayart's argument, here as in his earlier *The State in Africa*, would support this contention. Yet Bayart's 'historicity' agenda blinds him to this reality. Bayart's call for analytical respect of each country's singularity is well taken, but few would argue with it today. The same is true of his *repertoire* approach: most authors would agree with such a multivariate methodology. Bayart seems to still be waging a war with mechanical and universal versions of dependency theory but, since the 1980s, such a war is akin to attacking windmills.

Finally the civilisation argument has rather disturbing culturalist accents, even though Bayart warns us against this bias. Are Africans naturally rent seekers? What would Cameroon's entrepreneurial Bamiléké think of this? Do Africans typically underexploit their environment? Bayart does not seem aware of the economic literature which suggests that the lack of African private property rights in land was a function of its relative abundance. Labour, on the other hand, was scarce, to the point that it was *overexploited* through slavery.¹⁴ Hence, such 'cultural' features appear more readily to be rational responses to specific environments. The current tendency towards privatisation of land in Africa, under population pressures, further weakens the cultural explanation.¹⁵ In the end, Bayart's civilisation approach denies the very singularity of each country's experience which he was calling for.

The return of dependency theory?

William Reno's *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* is particularly interesting to the extent that, using Bayart's approach, he ends up drawing rather opposite conclusions. Reno's main thesis is that African informal markets are not just escape mechanisms from the predation of the state but actually play a role in 'rulers' construction of parallel political authority in the wake of near total decay of formal state institutions' (p 1). The state and informal markets are intertwined in local strategies of power and accumulation, and sharp analytical distinctions between them are misleading. When state officials 'pursue private interests in informal markets', they do so 'at the expense of the competence and credibility of the formal state in which they hold office' (p 2) and contribute to the rise of a 'Shadow State'. Such theory has, of course, far-reaching policy implications. For once, civil service reform *à la* Mamadou Dia is doomed to fail if the formal state is but a decoy.

In the first chapter, Reno rejects both state-and society-centred approaches to informal markets (aren't they two sides of the same coin, though?) as they fail to account for the role rulers play in these markets, and for the consequent blurring of the state—society distinction. He sees informal markets as the realm in which Bayart's 'elite accommodations' come to life (p 19). In their hegemonic quests, rulers increasingly use 'non-formal state power' to intervene in informal markets and seek opportunities and resources for clients (p 19). Thus, although the state is weakened by such strategies, it endures thanks to the alliances rulers build. In the end, the formal institutions inherited from colonialism are progressively redefined. In order to understand these contemporary configurations of power, Reno goes back to colonial history.

The second and third chapters are therefore illuminating thanks to their systematic analysis of the compromises between the colonial and postcolonial state (significantly, Reno does not even mention independence) and local chiefs. What comes out is that fiscally constrained colonial administrators secured alliances with local chiefs in a bid to buy stability on the cheap. In order to guarantee their compliance, the latter were given access to diamond markets and to the use of labour resources, thus, for the first time, 'Access to state power translated into private benefit' (p 33). This perverted existing relationships and norms between chiefs and their people and marked the beginning of the loss of legitimacy of the former (p 57) and the economic and political alienation of the latter (p 59). Ever since, attempts at reforming the formal state (from colonial attempts to contemporary stabilisation programmes) have resulted in a compensatory intensification of informal accommodations.

The following chapters extend the analysis to the Stevens and Momoh regimes and introduce an additional element: the role of international capital. In a nutshell, under pressure from international creditors to reform their state, political leaders enter alliances with foreign capital to undermine rival factions in the informal sector and guarantee additional rents. In exchange, the foreign actors gain access to the informal diamond market. Reno concludes on the changing nature of sovereignty in Africa and sees the Shadow State as a 'possible path for acquiring relatively greater state capabilities' (p 178).

This is beyond any doubt a fascinating analysis, backed by diligent and exhaustive fieldwork. One of the most interesting conclusions is the meaning of the role of foreign capital. To some extent, the alliance between domestic political elites and foreign capital, and its deleterious effects on state capacity and economic development, is reminiscent of dependency theory. It is therefore ironic that an analysis explicitly inspired by Bayart's concept of 'reciprocal assimilation of elites' ends up providing evidence for a theory whose rejection is one of Bayart's premises. Yet Reno's dependency-like conclusion,

and his hypothesis about the nature of informal markets, are both a function of the specific market (diamonds) he looks at. Other informal markets across Africa are more domestically orientated and would more probably support exit-from-predation theories.

In any case, Reno's analysis is a useful extension of Bayart's work. Whereas Bayart is mostly concerned with the formation of power, Reno provides evidence of the deleterious effects of postcolonial strategies of reciprocal assimilation for formal state capacity and economic performance.

Probing the state

Whereas Reno investigated the Shadow State Mahmood Mamdani probes the nature of the formal African postcolonial state. And, while Bayart minimised the significance of the colonial episode, Mamdani places it at the core of his theory. Mamdani's main thesis is that colonial rule, like South Africa's apartheid regime, was based on 'institutional segregation', a 'regime of differentiation' (p 7) which independence failed to abolish. Faced with the dilemma of establishing minority control over their conquests, colonial powers reserved a space of rights and direct rule to themselves, a white civil society, in urban areas and dominated the local African peasantry through indirect rule by either reconstituting or imposing tribal leadership as the local extension of the colonial state (p 17). Hence the 'bifurcated' nature of the colonial state. (Note also how Mamdani emphasises thereby the 'uncustomary' nature of native authorities.¹⁶) Independence succeeded in deracialising the state but failed to 'detribalise' it. In fact, the need for rulers to bridge the rural—urban gap to extend their hegemony led them to a retribalisation of the state through patrimonialism. Alliances were sought with local tribally defined leadership and the 'unreformed Native Authority came to contaminate civil society' (p 21). Some states attempted to impose a centralised despotic unification of rural society but increased thereby the rural—urban gap and eventually failed.

The enduring tribal nature of the local state has led to strategies of resistance also based on tribal identity. Thus clientelistic patrimonial strategies made ethnicity salient, and ethnicity became the form of identity by which resistance was also expressed. The weakness of 'tribalism as revolt', however, is that it reproduces the existing social fragmentation and divisions. Mamdani presents thereby a remarkable picture of Africa's predicament, through a unifying view of power and resistance.

The book develops this theory with a historical review of indirect rule in British, French and South Africa (chapter 3), and demonstrates the construction of customary law and the fusion of powers in chiefs by colonial powers (chapter 4), and the resulting domination of the 'free' peasantry (chapter 5). The second part reviews tribal strategies of resistance and the rare attempts to go beyond this logic with examples from Uganda (with the National Resistance Army) and South Africa.

Mamdani's work provides a theoretical background which supports Reno's perception of customary authority as an ally of state power in strategies of local domination. On the other hand, he is at odds with both Dia and Bayart. His view of native authority as essentially a colonial creation is a blow to Dia's conception of the 'indigenous' as accountable and legitimate. Whereas Dia's disconnect is an important theoretical insight, its application must be nuanced and the penetration of colonial motives into indigenous structures must be accounted for. In addition, Mamdani also brilliantly deconstructs the image of the customary as static, which Dia partly conveys. Mamdani exposes how the customary was made to appear static and 'antithetical to development' by those wishing to change existing patterns of land tenure (p 170). The dramatic consequence of this asset redistribution, in addition to immediate dispossession, was the long-run alienation

of Africa's rural communities from the process of development: 'If tradition was backwardness, then development would have to be induced from without, or at least from above' (p 170). As discussed in the review of Dia's book, more often than not, unfortunately, the alleged backwardness of tradition has become received wisdom, even among academics, where the assumption of dynamic inefficiency of traditional institutions is widespread. Witness economics Nobel Prize winner Douglass North's statement that 'tribal organization' is 'characteristic of stable patterns of very limited cooperation that have persisted through history' and where 'the skills and knowledge requisite to success on the part of the organizations or individuals involved did not entail or induce productive modifications of the basic institutional framework' and 'the sources of institutional change were external'.¹⁷ This equates to a denial of agency among rural dwellers. The truth is, however, that rural Africans have been plainly dispossessed, alienated from development. Pathologies such as atavism, lack of participatory attitudes and short-term thinking, when they exist, are therefore more a function of alienation than of culture.

Mamdani also contrasts with Bayart on this latter point. In addition, he specifically engages Bayart on the question of Africa's civilisation based on 'rents from dependence'. Bayart's vision of Africa's insertion in world capitalism as a function of its recurrent propensity for extraversion, Mamdani convincingly argues, makes modern imperialism become 'the outcome of an African initiative' (p 10).

Further, Mamdani goes beyond Reno by looking at the consequences of the essential mechanism underlying the process of reciprocal assimilation. In fact, the idea of an alliance between customary and modern elites is simplistic if it does not look at the nature of customary leadership and its relations with local communities. Mamdani shows the alienating consequences of the alliance between the local customary state and the national colonial one. By allowing chiefs to use their authority as a means towards personal strategies of accumulation, indirect colonial rule favoured a process of antagonisation between customary authority and its previous social foundations and of class fragmentation within the rural areas. Mamdani therefore sheds the light of compulsion on issues not usually addressed through the lens of power. A reading of his discussion of this regime of force imposed on the 'free' peasants adds a dimension missing, for example, in Bates' classical analysis of agricultural markets.¹⁸ Similarly, his insights on the clash between pastoralism and colonialism, and the consequent survival strategies of plunder by the affected communities, shows the truly tragic root of the problems of commons in Africa. The theoretical insight which unrelentingly emerges from his work is that the institutional analysis of development cannot afford to ignore the historical dimensions of power (institutions appear to endure for more than their capacity to reduce transactions costs—see p 160) and alienation (see p 165 for example).

On the side of liabilities, Mamdani's vision tends to be tainted by an East African bias. His conception of the anti-colonial struggle as fighting the local state, for example, is a case in point. Had he looked at Francophone West Africa instead, he would have seen an anti-colonial struggle aimed at the 'national' or supra-national state, as witnessed by the originally regional nature of parties such as the *Rassemblement Democratique, Africain* (RDA). Mamdani's concept of 'ethnic civil war' is also not very useful in understanding interethnic conflict.

In conclusion, these four superior books suggest, willingly or not, that there is no bypassing the problem of imported statehood in African development. They also hint that tackling this issue will call for either institutional adjustment (Dia, Reno), or preference adjustment such as the re-legitimation of chiefdoms through their democratisation (Mamdani).

Notes

- ¹ Max Weber, 'Politics as a vocation', in H H Gerth & C Wright Mills (eds) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, p 78 (italics Weber's).
- ² Chinua Achebe, *A Man of the People*, London: Heinemann, 1966, p 30.
- ³ In respective order: Robert Jackson & Carl Rosberg, 'Why Africa's weak states persist: the empirical and juridical in statehood', *World Politics*, 35(1), 1982, pp 1–24; Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Goran Hyden, *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983; William Zartman (ed), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995; Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State—Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988; Bertrand Badie, *L'Etat importé: Essai sur l'occidentalisation de l'ordre politique*, Paris: Fayard, 1992; and Thomas Callaghy, *The State—Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. The books by Jackson, Migdal and Badie extend their analysis beyond Africa.
- ⁴ One such notorious exception is Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*, London: James Currey, 1992. See also C S Whitaker, 'Doctrines of development and precepts of the state: the World Bank and the fifth iteration of the African case', in Richard Sklar & C S Whitaker (eds), *African Politics and Problems in Development*, Boulder, Co. Lynne Rienner, 1991, pp 333–353.
- ⁵ Bayart's idea of the 'rhizome' state, 'an infinitely variable multiplicity of networks whose underground branches join together the scattered points of society' was in fact developed in his earlier work and is not mentioned in the book under review here. See Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*, London: Longman, 1993, pp 218, 220.
- ⁶ Whitaker, 'Doctrines of development', pp 333–334.
- ⁷ Although I do not know Mr Dia and I do not believe it has any influence on my opinion of his book, I ought to mention that I was myself employed by the World Bank from 1988 to 1992.
- ⁸ His earlier work includes 'Development and cultural values in sub-Saharan Africa', *Finance and Development*, December 1991, pp 10–13; *A Governance Approach to Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Washington, DC: World Bank (Technical Paper 225), 1993; and 'Indigenous management practices: lessons for Africa's management in the '90s', in Ismail Serageldin & June Tabaroff (eds) *Culture and Development in Africa*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994, pp 165–191.
- ⁹ Stephen Cornell & Joseph Kalt have convincingly argued, in the context of American Indian reservations, that it was not the type of political culture but the legitimacy of political structures which determined the capacity of the state to bring about development. See their 'Where does economic development really come from? Constitutional rule among the contemporary Sioux and Apache', *Economic Inquiry*, XXXIII (3), 1995, pp 402–426.
- ¹⁰ Author's calculations, based on data from Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6.
- ¹¹ On this, see Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.
- ¹² This is a largely revised version of his earlier essay 'Finishing with the idea of the Third World: the concept of the political trajectory', in J Manor (ed) *Rethinking Third World Politics*, London: Longman, 1991, pp 51–71. All the quotations in this review are my translations.
- ¹³ John Lomdale Bruce Berman, *Unhappy Valley*, Portsmouth: James Currey, 1992.
- ¹⁴ For an exhaustive review of the 'traditional' features of African agriculture, see Hans Binswanger & John McIntire, 'Behavioral and material determinants of production relations in land-abundant tropical agriculture', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 36, 1987, pp 73–99.
- ¹⁵ See Jean Ensminger, *Making a Market: The Institutional Transformation of an African Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- ¹⁶ As a result of this analysis, Mamdani contests Goran Hyden's view that the African peasantry is uncaptured. On the contrary, he argues that, with the backing of state power, chiefs exert 'extra-economic compulsion' on villagers (p 52). See Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
- ¹⁷ Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p 125.
- ¹⁸ Robert Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.

